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Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 29 (July 27, 2007) 1
ADMINSTRATIVE LAW-WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO
Summary
Petition granted in part and denied in part for a writ of quo warranto challenging a
chief justice’s authority to require another district judge to meet with a committee of
judges, to remove and reassign that judge’s criminal caseload, and to temporarily bar that
judge from entering the courthouse.
Disposition/ Outcome
Chief Judge Hardcastle’s actions in appointing a three-judge committee and in
removing Judge Halverson’s criminal cases constituted a proper exercise of her
administrative authority; a writ of quo warranto is not warranted to address those issues.
However, with respect to a May 10th order banning Judge Halverson from the justice
center until she cooperates. Chief Judge Hardcastle overstepped her authority.
Factual and Procedural History
In 2006, the people of Clark County elected Elizabeth Halverson to a district court
judgeship. Three moths after assuming duties, Halverson asserts that in an article Judge
Hardcastle, chief judge of the Eight Judicial District, commented on the judge’s
performance. During the next several weeks, events took place which led to the instant
quo warranto proceeding.
The first event occurred when Chief Judge Hardcastle asked s three-judge panel to
assist Halverson’s transition on the bench after alleged reports that she met with jurors in
a criminal matter outside the presence of counsel’s presence and often demeaned her
staff. The panel submitted reports regarding Halverson’s behavior with her staff and
inappropriate comments while conducting trials. The committee of judges explained to
Halverson the “specifics” of her alleged improper behavior and she became “defensive.”
Despite Chief Judge Hardcastle’s purported beneficial intentions, Judge Halverson
viewed the committee’s review of her and her staff as punitive.
The second event occurred when Chief Judge Hardcastle reassigned Halverson’s
criminal caseload to other incoming judges, each of whom had extensive experience in
criminal law, and gave Halverson a “civil-only” caseload. While Halverson “was
initially receptive” to the reassignment, she later protested arguing that the change was
punitive.
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The third event occurred when Halverson was barred form the Clark County
Regional Justice Center. Halverson personally hired two “bodyguards” to secure the
office for her and her staff without the informing court administration or court security.
There was an unauthorized search in Judge Halverson’s chambers but the personal
bodyguards stopped the group before entering the office. The following day, Hardcastle
met with the three-judge committee and the court administration to discuss the previous
day’s events. They all agreed that the bodyguards should be removed from the
courthouse and that Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department should be present when
the removal occurred. The removal did not take place and the police left without incident.
Halverson insisted that she was allowed to retain private bodyguards. She later was
asked to meet with the judge committee, but refused because she was not contacted
through her attorney. Chief Judge Hardcastle, the presiding judges, and the court
administration agreed that Halverson and her bodyguards should be removed until
Halverson agreed to meet with them to discuss everyone’s security concerns.
On May 10, 2007, Hardcastle entered an administrative order prohibiting
Halverson and her two private bodyguards from entering the Regional Justice Center.
Judge Halverson contends that she was not notified nor had the opportunity to be heard
before being banned from the building. Chief Judge Hardcastle ordered that, “in order to
protect public safety and to prevent further interference with the orderly administration of
justice in the courthouse,” Halverson, effective immediately, was barred from the justice
center until she agreed to meet with the three-judge committee.
Halverson’s petition for writ of quo warranto followed these events, in which
Judge Halverson specifically challenges Judge Hardcastle’s authority to do three things:
(1) require her to meet with the three-judge committee concerning her judicial and
nonjudicial activities; (2) remove and reassign her criminal caseload; (3) order that she be
barred from the justice center until she agrees both to meet with the committee of judges
and to discontinue her “disruptive behavior and threats to courthouse security.”
Discussion
A chief judge is authorized to administratively coordinate “the smooth running of
court business,” however, all elected judges enjoy coextensive and concurrent jurisdiction
and power, and the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline enjoys exclusive authority
over formal judicial discipline. Thus, if the chief judge’s administrative powers include
the evaluation of a fellow judge’s conduct and rendering punishment against a judge,
such action will interfere with other judicial officers and the Nevada Commission on
Judicial Discipline.
The chief judge is broadly authorized to carry out the district courts’ inherent
authority to ensure the orderly administration of judicial business. As long as the chief
judge follows relevant statutes and court rules, he or she may convene committees of
judges to review another judge’s conduct in processing cases and even remove or
reassign cases. Also, under certain circumstances, she may properly exercise her
supervisory authority over court business to ban another judge from the courthouse.
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However, her supervisory authority is limited to emergency circumstances that were not
demonstrated here.
In order to accomplish a chief justice’s administrative obligations, the chief judge
“must” appoint a committee of judges so that the committee could attempt to address
issues relating to Judge Halverson’s conduct on and off the bench. However, a chief
judge has no authority to require a judge to meet with the committee to discuss her
performance and then ban her from the courthouse. The proper remedy, absent an
emergency situation, would be wither with Nevada Supreme Court, as “administrative
head of the court system,” or, if appropriate, with the judicial discipline commission.
A chief judge does not have either express authority or inherent authority in
banning a judge from the courthouse. In the absence or properly adopted security rules or
other explicitly states authority permitting the chief judge to ban other judges from the
courthouse, no express authority for such action has been shown. A chief judge may not
exercise his or her inherent authority to bar other district judges from performing their
judicial duties, except in emergency situations in which no other adequate means exist to
preserve court security or reasonably necessary court functions. Chief Judge Hardcastle
has not demonstrated that such an emergency authorized the use of her inherent powers to
immediately ban Judge Halverson from the justice center in order to protect the proper
administration of justice, or that she had not adequate means by which to do so.
Hardcastle exceeded her powers as chief judge, effectively intruding upon Halverson’s
exercise of judicial functions.
The reassignment of criminal cases was appropriate because the chief judge can
do so out of valid “convenience” and “necessity” reasons. Halverson had more
experience in the civil law arena, and allowing her more time to become proficient on
criminal procedure could help the court to operate more efficiently.
Conclusion
Petition for a writ of quo warranto is granted in part and denied in part. Chief
Judge Hardcastle’s actions in appointing a three-judge committee and in removing Judge
Halverson’s criminal cases constituted a proper exercise of her administrative authority, a
writ of quo warranto is not warranted to address those issues. However, with respect to a
May 10th order banning Judge Halverson from the justice center until she cooperates.
Chief Judge Hardcastle overstepped her authority.
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